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In the forty years since Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 there have been significant changes in the

landscape of American workplaces, schools, colleges, and univer
sities, and in the number of economic opportunities to contract
with government agencies. During that time, women have entered
many areas of public and private employment in a steady, increas
ingly significant fashion. Affirmative action programs have ac
counted for a great deal of the increase in the number of women
and minorities in the workplace. While such programs have al
ways been controversial, they have also spurred inclusiveness in
educational settings and government contracting.2
This article analyzes affirmative action in employment: one of
the most controversial government policies of the last decade, and
one that continues to divide the passions and sensibilities of
Americans. This article also addresses the effects of Title vn on
employment opportunities for women. In particular, the article
considers how successful the fundamental policies of Title VII
have been in increasing diversity on corporate boards of directors,
and investigates whether increased diversity will improve the per
formance of publicly traded companies.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20023 (SOX) reflects public out
rage at highly publicized corporate excesses and, more fundamen1.

42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).

2.
See Rebecca Hanner White, Affinnative Action in the Workplace:
The Significance of Grutter , 92 Ky. L.1. 263 (2003); Eric A. Tilles,Lessonsfrom
Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affinnative Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J.
451 (2004).
3.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810
(to be codified at titles 11, 15,18,28, and 29 of U.S.C. (Supp. II 2004».
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tally, indicates widespread public disapproval of corporate boards'
composition, lack of independence from management, and poor
internal and external controls over corporate financial reporting
and integrity.4 Improved gender and racial diversity of corporate
governing boards would enhance SOX's fundamental policy of
increased integrity in the management of large corporations
through greater independence and competence of their directors.
In this regard, the congruence of the policies of national employ
ment opportunities and national economic policy favors increased
opportunities for women and minorities and promotes greater cor
porate governance by independent and competent directors.
This article proceeds as follows: the first part briefly describes
federal governmental affirmative action policy in the areas of em
ployment, government contracting, and education, explaining how
affirmative action plans have increased employment opportunities
for the intended beneficiaries of the legislation; the second part
discusses current issues in the application of affirmative action
policies in employment relationships and examines the rates at
which women and minorities have risen to leadership positions in
settings outside the direct reach of Title VII. This part of the arti
cle addresses the issue of whether Title VII-with its avowed pur
pose of promoting fair employment practices and increased inclu
sion of women and minorities in the workforce-has been success
ful in extending the quality and scope of economic opportunity to
those formerly un-enfranchised members of American society.
This part of the article also demonstrates that the roles of women
and minorities on the boards of publicly-held corporations have not
significantly expanded, even given the pervasive application of
Title VII to other sectors of the economy. The final part examines
the impact of national economic policy on effectively managed
corporations, and considers whether greater diversity on corporate
boards advances national economic policy. In particular, this part
of the article examines the policies underlying federal corporate
law embraced by SOX, and concludes that greater diversity on

4.
Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Di
rectors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 394406 (2005).
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corporate boards of directors helps to realize those policy initia
tives.
I. GOVERNMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES
To understand the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act and
the employment provisions contained in Title VII, it is necessary to
review briefly the history of affirmative action policies and of the
overarching fight against paternalism for equality of opportunity .
The first section describes the movement of national policy from
"separate but equal" treatment of the races to equality. The follow
ing section describes the development of affirmative action pro
grams, and promotes equality of treatment as a way of implement
ing broad national policy .
A.

From Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education

In Plessy v. Ferguson,5 the United States Supreme Court held
that racially-segregated railway cars were constitutional and rea
sonable, and that they did not violate the civil rights of black
Americans. This decision, astounding in hindsight, was rooted in
the political perception prevalent in 1896 that federal courts lacked
both the power to elevate federal law over state law and the author
ity to re-order social relations between races in the United States.6
For example, the Court stated that
[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in
places where they are liable to be brought into contact do
not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recog
nized as within the competency of state legislatures in
7
the exercises of their police power.

The Court also stated,
[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or
to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences,

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

5.
6.

JACK GREENBERG,CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS

7.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.

57-58 (1994).
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and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating
the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and
political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be in
ferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be in
ferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
8
States cannot put them upon the same plane.

The rule in Plessy v. Ferguson continued as the law of the na
tion until the 1950s, when civil rights activists returned to the
courts to revisit the inherent assumptions of the Plessy and to argue
that minority Americans--ciespite the mandates of the Fourteenth
Amendment-would never achieve equal civil and political treat
ment if the courts and Congress continued to permit manifest ine
quality in the social relations among the races.9 The subsequent
line of Supreme Court cases reflected the validity of this argument:
the Court declared racial segregation in elementary public educa
tion unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education. \0 Racial
discrimination in access to public beaches soon followed, II as did
discrimination in public transport�tion on bussesl2 and in access to
public parks.13 Later, the Court declared that access to state court
rooms could not be conditioned or limited on the basis of race, 14
and that discrimination in access to public golf courses was uncon
stitutional.15
This line of cases joined the cases implementing the remedial
order in Brown v. Board of Educationl6 to set the stage for the
,,
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Act ).17 Congress intended
the Act to prevent discrimination by the states by implementing the

8.
9.

Id. at 551-52.
GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 85-92.

to.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

11.

See Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per cu-

riam).

12.
13.

See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S.

54 (1958) (per curiam).
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1964) (per curiam).
14.
15.
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (commonly referred
16.
to as Brown II).
17.
42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
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protections inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment. It forbade dis
crimination in public accommodations in Titles II and III, gave the
Attorney General power to enforce the order in Brown v. Board of
Education, and prohibited discrimination in employment in Title
VII.
A year after signing the Act into law, President Johnson at
tacked employment discrimination with Executive Order 1 1,246.
That order required recipients of federal contracts in excess of
$50,000 to prepare and file written affirmative action plans, pro
hibited those companies from discriminating in employment deci
sions, mandated that they undertake affirmative steps in recruiting,
and necessitated that they upgrade the employment condition of
current minority and female employees. 18 Throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, Congress enacted laws, and federal government agen
cies implemented policies to promote greater minority ownership
of businesses and employment of minorities. 19 By the early 1980s,
hundreds of local government agencies were following the federal
government's lead, and had implemented affirmative action pro
grams to increase the number of contracts signed with minority
businesses.
In designing remedies to address past patterns and practices of
discrimination in employment on the basis of gender or race, the
courts and government agencies created innovative remedial orders
and encouraged employers to be creative in addressing these pat18.
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.P.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2000). President Johnson expanded the list of
protected categories of employees under Executive Order 11246 to include
women in 1967. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 17, 1967).
19.
In 1967, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was amended to
order the Small Business Administration to assist small minority-owned busi
nesses. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2701, 2706 (2000), repealed by 42 U.S.c. § 9912(a)
(2000). The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.c. §§ 6701, 6710
and in 1978, the Small Business Act were amended to establish percentage goals
in the procurement for minority firms, requiring at least ten percent of all federal
grants for local public works projects to be expended with minority businesses.
It also directed the Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with federal depart
ments and agencies, to develop comprehensive minority enterprise programs and
institute specific goals for minority firms in federal procurement. For a descrip
tion of the history of Congressional efforts to promote minority business owners
and employees, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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terns.20 Moreover, the EEOC promoted the use of such programs
with a goal of improving the number of women and minorities who
were hired, retained, and promoted in positions that formerly were
held almost exclusively by white males.21
Furthermore, private and public employers, for various rea
sons, began to consider voluntary programs aimed at increasing the
number of women and minorities in both skilled and unskilled po
sitions. In tum, public response increasingly called upon the courts
to address the appropriateness and constitutionality of these reme
dial programs.22
B.

The Affirmative Action Remedy in Employment Cases

Since the passage of Title VII in 1964, the courts have fre
quently resorted to the use of affirmative action plans to address
past discrimination.23 These plans are designed to remedy past
discrimination by affirmatively altering hiring and promotion pro
grams in employment settings.24
However, court-ordered or court-designed plans are not the
only manifestations of the theory that government and business are
responsible for re-ordering social relations between races and
sexes. Affirmative action plans and policies have developed in
essentially three major areas: government contracts, court-ordered
relief for demonstrated discrimination, and voluntary employer
developed approaches.25 Most pertinent to this article are those
20.

See, e. g. , Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also,

ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1992).
2l.
29 c.F.R. § 1608 (2004). For example, in 1978, the EEOC issued
guidelines designed to promote the development of employer affrrmative action
plans. See id.
22.
See Robert Belton, Reflections on Affirmative Action After Paradise
and Johnson, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. US (1988).
23.
See MARK W. BENNETT, DONALD J. POLDEN & HOWARD RUSIN,
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.01 (2005).
24.
See, e. g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
25.
See Richard Appel, Alison Gray & Nilufer Loy, Affirmative Action in
the Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549, 550
(2005) (hereinafter Affirmative Action After Forty Years); James E. Jones, Jr.,

The Genesis and Present Status of Af
f irmative Action in Employment: Eco
nomic, Legal and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L. REv. 901 (1985).
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plans and policies created and implemented on a voluntary basis by
employers, usually with subsequent review by federal courts.
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company,26 the
Court held that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks from
certain forms of racial discrimination.27 While the case did not
involve affirmative action programs, it did lay the groundwork for
later arguments that such programs, when used to remedy past dis
crimination, cannot discriminate against whites-even when those
programs were specifically designed to promote the employment
of blacks or other disadvantaged minority groups.
For example, in United Steelworkers v. Weber,28 Kaiser, the
employer, designed an affirmative action program to eliminate
conspicuous racial imbalance in its steelworker work force. 29 The
program was voluntarily created by the employer and did not stem
from a compulsory order of a court or agency.3D The question pre
sented to the Court by this case was whether Title VII forbids pri
vate employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona
fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences.31
In rendering its decision, the Court stressed the voluntary and
private nature of the plan, and indicated that courts should consider
Title VII's ban of discrimination against the background of its leg
islative history.32 According to the Court, to read sections 703(a)
and (b) as banning race-conscious affirmative action would bring
about a result completely at variance with the purposes of the
ACt.33 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to pro
hibit private and voluntary affirmative action efforts as one method
of solving problems of black citizens' access to the workforce.34
The Court relied on the Congressional record, including a state
ment in the House Report, that Title VII and government leader-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32
33.
34.
.

427 U.S. 273 (1976).
Id. at 295.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 197-99.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 203-04.
/d.

Id. at 204-05.
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ship "will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local
resolution of other forms of discrimination."35
The United Steelworkers Court, while refusing to define, in
detail, the line between permissible and impermissible affirmative
action plans, carefully delineated the scope of its ruling to require
that:
•

The purposes of the plan be aligned with the purpose

of the Act-to open employment opportunities for Ne�
groes;
•

It be a voluntary plan;

•

The plan not create "an absolute bar to the advance�

ment of white employees"; and
•

It be a temporary measure and conclude after its goals

have been met.

In Johnson

v.

36

Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County

37

the Court considered a county government plan for hiring and
promoting women and minorities in job positions and classifica
tions in which they are underrepresented.38 The plan was designed
to achieve a statistically measurable yearly improvement in those
classifications, and the long�term goal was to attain a workforce
whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and
women in the area labor force.39 A woman, Diane Joyce, was se
lected for promotion over a similarly "well qualified" male for a
craft�worker position, for which no women had been hired previ�

35.
Id. at 203-04 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 914, at 18 (1963». The cited
portion of the House Report states:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes
and consequences of racial and other types of discrimination
against minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that
national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal leg�
islation dealing with the most troublesome problems will cre�
ate an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution
of other forms of discrimination.
/d. (citation omitted).
36.
United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
480 U.S. 616 (1987).
37.
38.
Id. at 620-21.
39.
Id. at 621-23.
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ously-despite the fact that 238 such positions existed.40 The male
employee sued.41
The Court held it was appropriate to take sex or gender into
account in determining that Joyce should be promoted.42 The
Court found that the County's plan was a "moderate, flexible, case
by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the repre
,,
sentation of minorities and women. 43 The Court also concluded
that the disappointed male employee had the burden of demonstrat
ing that the employer's affirmative action plan was invalid and that
its justification was a pre-textual discrimination against white male
employees.44
Against the backdrop of the U.S. Supreme Court cases ad
dressing the use of affirmative action programs to accomplish the
broad legislative goals of the Civil Rights Act, it is clear that Title
VII: (1) directly sanctions imposition of affirmative action plans to
address past discrimination and patterns of discrimination; (2)
permits state actors to create affirmative action plans designed to
increase representation of women and minorities in job positions in
which they are historically underrepresented, so long as such plans
are moderate, temporary, and designed and intended to attain a
balanced workforce; and (3) does not forbid private actors from
voluntarily creating action plans to increase representation of
women and minorities, so long as those plans are temporary and do
not create an absolute bar to white or male employees.45
The national policy of equality of opportunity in employment,
manifested in the history and application of Title VII, requires the
use of remedial action plans to correct the effects of past or con
tinuing discrimination. Affirmative action plans and programs also
are appropriate to increase the numbers of women and minorities
in many employment settings, either by establishing government
contractor hiring quotas or by encouraging voluntary plans by em
ployers. However, many hiring decisions do not lend themselves

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 619.
/d. at 625.

Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 642.
/d. at 626-27.

See Appel et al., supra note 25, at 559-65.
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easily or explicitly to the proscriptions of Title VII, such as in the
selection of corporate boards of directors or in the appointment of
the federal jUdiciary. The question thus becomes whether the poli
cies of Title VII apply implicitly to these selection and appoint
ment processes, as well as to the broader employment setting.
II.

THE LEGACY OF TITLE VII AND THE CREATION OF "AN ATMOS
PHERE CONDUCIVE" TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

Viewed in historical perspective, the legacy of Title VII is its
success in combating discrimination in hiring, in promotion, and in
other aspects of the employment relationship. Moreover, Title VII
has promoted a greater degree of voluntary integration of women
and minorities into the workforce though affirmative action plans
and EEOC guidelines.46 A narrower, but equally important, view
of the historical impact of the Civil Rights Act and of Title VII
considers the degree to which affirmative action plans combine
with overarching national policy to increase representation of
women and minorities in historically unrepresented fields and oc
cupations and to create "an atmosphere conducive to voluntary and
,,
local resolution of other forms of discrimination. 47 This language
of legislative purpose captures one of the most fundamental aspira
tions of the civil rights movement, and the resulting legislation,
which is to prevent continuing discrimination in employment and
to remedy past discrimination against protected classes.
The prevalence of women and minorities in key governance
positions-positions of responsibility that, while not covered by
Title VII's reach-signal the extent to which the underlying na
tional policy of Title VII has created an atmosphere conducive to
increased opportunities for women and minorities.

46.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (2004). The EEOC guidelines provide a safe

harbor for employers, labor unions and others who create voluntary programs to
advance opportunities for minorities and women. /d. §§ 1608.2, 1608.1O(b)
(2004). The guidelines make it clear that Congress did not want to expose em
ployers to potential liability in a reverse discrimination lawsuit where they cre
ated an action plan to increase minority representation in the workforce. Id. §
1608.1(a).
47.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1979) (citation
omitted).
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A. Judicial Appointments

The appointment of federal appellate judges is accomplished
by a constitutionally mandated procedure in which the President
nominates a person for a judicial position and the United States
Senate then confirms the appointment.48 Because the federal
nomination process is a political one, it does not fall within the
oversight of the EEOC or the letter of Title VII. Because it is a
political appointment of the highest national significance, the proc
ess should fall within the spirit of those provisions.
From President Johnson's through President Clinton's term of
office, the pattern of judicial appointments from 1963 to 2000
demonstrates that the national policies of Title VII have not been
manifested in the political appointments of appellate judges.
Rather, very few women and minorities were appointed to these
significant positions in federal government. Ironically, although
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Title VII into law, he ap
pointed extremely few women and minorities to the federal appel
late courts. Successors Gerald Ford and Richard Nixon appointed
no women, and appointed virtually no minority lawyers out of the
fifty-seven appointments they collectively made. The following
table shows the number and percentage of female and minority
judges appointed to federal courts of appeal, not including the
United States Supreme Court, from 1993 to 2000:

President

Johnson
(1963-1 968)

Nixon
(1 969-1 974)
Carter

(1 977-1980)

No.

Male

Female

Minority

40

97.5%

2.5%

5%

45

1 00%

0%

2.2%

56

80.4%

1 9.6%

21 .5%

Appointees

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (2004); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 1112 (Basic Books, 1994).

48.
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Reagan

(1981-1 988)
Bush

(1 989-1 992)
Clinton

(1993-2000)

79

78

94.9%

5.1 %

2.6%

37

81 .1 %

1 8.9%

1 0.8%

61

67.2%

32.8%

26.2%

The relatively low numbers of women and minority lawyers
during that time period may have contributed to the extremely low
percentage of women and minorities appointed to the federal ap
pellate courtS.49 However, the number of women and minority
lawyers was high enough (and the number of overall appointments
low enough) to improve these appointment statistics in keeping
with the national policy evident in Title VII. Given the number of
women and minority lawyers in the United States during the
Reagan presidency, the paucity-of-numbers argument fails to ex
plain the surprising appointment results during that period: ninety
five percent were men, and ninety-seven percent were white.
The history of appointments of women and minorities to the
federal judiciary clearly demonstrates that the purposes of Title VII
did not resonate in the White House and United States Senate, and
that the Civil Rights Act had not created an atmosphere conducive
to the integration of women and minority lawyers into the integral
part of American society. But, as the next section demonstrates,
49.

See ABA, LEGAL

EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-

AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REpORT OF THE TASKFORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS
AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 18-15 (1992). The ABA report
demonstrates that in 1965-66, only 4.2 percent of students enrolled in law
school were women (2,374 total). /d. at 18. By 1991-92,42.5% were women
(55,110 total). [d. The change in enrollment reflects a corresponding and sig
nificant increase in women lawyers: in 1960-61, only 2.6% of all lawyers were
women, but this increased to 22% by 1990-1991. [d. at 20. The number of
minority lawyers and the rate of growth in the number of minority lawyers were
less impressive than with women. However, there was a significant increase in
minority lawyers during this period of time. In 1960, there were only 2,012
African American lawyers-less than 1% of all lawyers in America. [d. at 2324. By 1970,there were 3,728 African American lawyers,or 1% of all lawyers;
by 1980, there were 14,839 African American lawyers (or 2.7% of all lawyers);
and by 1990, there were 25,704 African American lawyers (3.3% of all law
yers). [d.
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the federal appellate courts are not the only significant sector of the
economy that was seemingly unresponsive to a national policy
committed to improving the representation of women and minori
ties in leadership positions throughout society.
B. Women in Corporate Leadership Roles

A leadership role analogous to federal appellate judges is se
lection to and service on the board of directors of a publicly-held
corporation. Both positions require leadership skills such as deci
sion making abilities, substantive knowledge of interdisciplinary
fields (for example, business, law, accounting, etc.), and problem
solving abilities. They also require that persons selected for the
positions have values such as independence, integrity, and moral
responsibility, appropriate to the high level of responsibility re
posed in these positions.
The historical evidence of the integration of women into posi
tions of responsibility--especially on boards of directors in Ameri
can corporations-is as disappointing as the record is for appoint
ments to federal courts of appeal. Several analysts and researchers
have reported that the representation of women and minorities on
boards of directors is unusually small. In 2002, women held only
13% of the board seats in the Standard & Poor' s (S&P) largest 500
corporations, only 10% of the 7500 board seats in S&P 1500 cor
porations, and 11% of the board seats on Fortune 1000 corpora
tions.50 Another commentator reports that only 13% of board posi
tions of national companies are held by women, and that almost
half of Fortune 500 companies have only one woman--or even no
women at all--on their boards.51 However, researchers have re-

Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Boards Lack Gender, Racial Equality,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
ONLINE,
http://www.careerjournal.comlcolumnists/inthleadl20030709-inthelead.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
51.
Susan Estrich, Too Bad No One Pays Attention to Gender Now,
INDYSTAR.COM, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.indystar.comlarticlesl612221412636-021.html. Professor Estrich points to a disturbing trend: the growth in
appointment of women directors has essentially stagnated at about 13%, grow
ing only 2% over a five-year period, while the growth of women in medical
school (44%) and law school (51%) has been significant. [d. She further re-
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ported a gradual trend toward more women directors of large com
panies. Catalyst's 2003 report on women directors notes that in
2003, 13.6% of all Fortune 500 companies' board seats were held
by women, up from 9.6% in 1995.52 Further, it notes that in 2003,
fifty-four companies had 25% or more of their board seats held by
women directors, up from eleven companies in 1995.53
This portrait of female leadership on boards of directors is un
fortunately more optimistic than that of women in key managerial
positions. In 1963, Katherine Graham, CEO of the Washington
Post, was the only woman CEO of a major firm. When she retired
in 1991, Graham was one of only two women CEOs in major
American firms.54 In 1999, there were only three.55
C.

Implications from Data on Leadership Roles of Women in Ju
dicial and Corporate Positions

These reports and surveys demonstrate that the salutary effects
of Title VII have not been realized in at least two significant lead
ership and governance positions in America. This history suggests
that the goals and aspirations of the Civil Rights Act, and, more
specifically, Title VII, have not been fully achieved. In particular,
this history demonstrates that the anticipated beneficial effects of
women and minority leaders in two of society'S most significant
roles have not been realized in courtrooms and boardrooms. The
goals of Title VII-barring discrimination in employment on the
basis of sex and race on the one hand, and encouraging more di
verse workplaces because of the economic, social, and cultural
implications of greater diversity of the workforce on the other
reflect a fundamental belief that an integrated, fairly accessible

ports, however, that only 30% of all business-school graduates are women. [d.
2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS (2004),
52.
http://www.catalyst.orglbookstore/perspective/04jan.pdf.
53.
[d. The evidence of representation on publically traded company
boards' of directors by minorities is similar to the evidence concerning women.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005
WIS. L. REv. 795, 799-803 (2005).
54.
Estrich, supra note 51.

55.

[d.
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workplace best serves the national economic interest, reflects pre
vailing social norms, and is required by the Constitution.
III.

PUB LIC POLICY AND WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP POSI
TIONS

In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act56 (SOX) to

address both significant abuses of positional power by corporate
officers and also lackadaisical governance by the directors of those
corporations. The underlying philosophy of SOX provokes the
question of whether American publicly-held corporations will be
better administered if more women directors are appointed and,
correspondingly, whether the promise of Title VII is promoted by
great numbers of women in leadership positions.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Importance of Independent Directors

In the wake of recent corporate scandals surrounding corpo

rate giants such as Enron, MCI, and Adelphi, Congress undertook
a necessary and rapid examination of contemporary corporate prac
tices.57 In particular, embarrassed legislators and regulators at
tempted to discover the sources of systemic corruption in some of
America's largest corporations, including schemes to inflate corpo
rate earnings to strengthen share price, self-dealing transactions,
misappropriation of corporate assets, and others.58
This bi-partisan effort in Congress resulted in the passage of
SOX. In broad terms, SOX essentially federalized the core of state
law dealing with the fiduciary and due care duties of directors and
officers.59 SOX also affected the composition of boards of direc
tors by requiring audit committees composed of "independent"
See supra note 3.
56.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeep
57.
ers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1403-05 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, Fonn Over
Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Ac
countability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 1,6-8 (2002).
58.
See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and
Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 498-99 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds.
2004).
Fairfax, supra note 4, at 396-400.
59.
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directors. The legislation, together with implementing and sup
porting stock exchange rules, mandated greater board oversight
and monitoring in several critical areas like executive compensa
tion, disclosure of earning and profitability, and matters relating to
operations of the corporation.60
The Act also requires public companies to promulgate codes
of ethics, extends protections to "whistleblowers," and mandates
that in-house counsel disclose potential management wrongdoing.61
Furthermore, SOX imposes additional obligations on directors to
maintain updated knowledge about internal matters in the corpora
tion, with particular attention to financial and reporting require
ments.62 Significantly, SOX requires directors to monitor all attor
neys, as well as any agents of the corporation suspected of engag
ing in fraudulent activities.63 In this manner, according to Profes
sor Lisa Fairfax, "Sarbanes-Oxley not only federalizes corporate
fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them. This federaliza
tion represents an attempt to restore directors' fidelity to their fidu
,,
ciary duties. 64
The theme of "independence" by directors was a recurrent one
in discussions about SOX, and its adoption builds on a growing
body of corporate law and policy seeking to increase the independ
ence of directors of publicly-held corporations. For example, the
independence of corporate directors is a cornerstone of the Ameri
can Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance and Struc
ture (Principles).65 The Principles address the very controversial
issue of the appropriate role of independent directors in the gov
ernance of the modem American corporation, and seek to increase
the structural independence of directors appointed to those corpo
rations.66
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

[d. at 403-05.
[d. at 403-04.
[d. at 402-03.
[d. at 404.
Id. at 406.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
66.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1035 (1993). See also
Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 265, 267�8
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This contemporary focus on the independence of directors is
also seen in the literature on the roles and responsibilities of corpo
rate directors. Legal scholars and corporate lawyers tend to view
·the responsibilities of directors in their roles as monitors of man
agement, as managers of the policy-setting entity of the corpora
tion, and as figureheads defining the relationship the corporation
has with shareholders and external constituencies.67 These con
structs of the duties that directors are expected to exercise and the
values and competencies they are expected to bring to delibera
tions are increasingly premised on their independence from man
agement and from other insiders within the corporation.
Such an emphasis on independence as a value requires a seri
ous consideration of how to construct or compose a board that is
not only independent at its core, but exhibits the fundamental at
tribute that independent decision makers, such as judges, would
bring to the most serious decisions of the body. The result of those
considerations emerges as a growing awareness in the business
community that a diverse board may make better decisions than
one dominated by insiders.
B. Independence, Character and Gender: Some Evidence and
Theories

Empirical evidence suggests that a more diverse governance
board will outperform a less diverse board in several significant
ways. These findings have significant implications for the diver
sity of American corporations' boards of directors, especially in
light of the apparent reluctance management has traditionally ex
hibited when considering female and minority appointments to
these boards.
For example, one published survey reports that 86% of
women directors and 82% of minority directors are "independent,"
in the sense that they do not have ties with the corporations' man-

(1997).
67.
See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of
Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 781, 787-94 (2003); Fisch, supra note 66, at
268-75.
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agement.68 By contrast, only 70% of directors as a whole are inde
pendent under this definition.
In addition, women and minority directors seem to ask differ
ent questions than white male directors, and bring different sets of
experiences and concerns with them to the boardroom.69 The Con
ference Board of Canada, in a 2002 report, found a strong link be
tween female representation on boards of directors and good cor
porate governance.70 Researchers have found that 94% of boards
with three or more women members insisted on conflict-of-interest
guidelines, compared to only 58% of all male boards of directors.71
Researchers also reported that female directors are more likely
than are their male counterparts to pay attention to audits, as well
as risk oversight and risk control.72 Furthermore, 72% of boards
with two or more women directors conducted formal board per
formance evaluations, while only 49% of all male boards of direc
tors perform such evaluations.73 The Conference Board also found
that boards of directors with women directors are significantly
more likely to provide formal written limits on board members'
authority than all male boards.74
The empirical evidence concerning how gender diversity (and,
some suggest, racial and ethnic diversity, by extension) improves
efficiency and competence of corporate boards is further advanced
by policy analysis suggesting that greater diversity of viewpoints
improves corporate performance. 75 For example, some academic
scholars have argued that corporations lacking in meaningful input
from diverse leadership are more likely to engage in liability
enhancing conduct, because they are unable to empathize with
their constituencies.76 Specifically, it has been argued that firms

68.
Hymowitz, supra note 50.
Id.
69.
Judy B. Rosener, Ph.D, Women on Corporate Boards Make Good
70.
Business Sense, WOMENSMEDIA (2003), http://www.womensmedia.com/
newlRosener-corporate-board-women.shtml.
7 1.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
/d.
/d.

Dallas, supra note 67,at 810.
See Fairfax, supra note 4; Dallas, supra note 67; Donald C.
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such as Coca-Cola and Texaco were sued by classes of employees
claiming employment discrimination because the corporate leader
ship lacked the capacity to relate empathetically with their respec
tive workforces.77
There are at least two aspects of this assertion: first, there is
concern that all white, male boards will lack empathy for a firm' s
workforce that is significantly populated by women or minority
employees.78 According to this analysis, the ability of a more di
verse board of directors and management to relate with empathy to
women and minorities will reduce claims of race or sexual dis
crimination.79 Second, there is a concern that these boards will
tend to identify with each other, and will thereby lose objectivity
when called upon to make difficult or liability-enhancing deci
sions.80
According to the analysis, a significantly white and male
board of directors may develop an "in group" perspective to gov
ernance of the corporation.81 Without input from culturally distinct
perspectives, they could lose the flexibility necessary to respond to
the needs of the firm in a developing context.82
The concept of "in group" cohesion has another, more signifi
cant, implication for corporate governance structures: such non
diverse governance groups also can be too sympathetic to other
members of the group, to the detriment of the company as a
whole.83 For example, this closeness can impede individual board
member decision making when a special committee of independent

Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J.
797 (2001).
77.
Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TvL. L. REv. 1461, 1481-82
(2002).
/d. at 1473.
78.
[d. at 1481.
79.
80.
Langevoort, supra note 76, at 810-11.
Id. at 811.
81.

82.
83.

Id.
[d.
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directors is asked to investigate claims of self dealing or of a
breach of fiduciary duty by another director. 84
By contrast, the emerging, post-Enron description of contem
porary American corporate boards of directors emphasizes the im
portance of balance between independent or outside directors and
inside directors, as well as the importance of composing a diverse
board. 85 These "balanced" governance boards are considered by
many authorities to be more efficient in discharging the many roles
of directors of publicly-held corporations.86 The efficiency of this
governance model may improve overall firm performance. 87 Ac
cording to Professor Donald Langevoort, "[t]he most productive
boards are ones that have enough diversity to encourage the shar
ing of information and active consideration of alternatives, but
enough collegiality to sustain mutual commitment and make con
sensus-reaching practicable within the tight time frames in which
boards must operate." 88 These considerations indicate the growing

84.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1981)
(acknowledging that empathy may play a role when a special committee of the
board is asked to respond to a demand that the corporation bring a derivative
action alleging directorial or managerial wrongdoing.). See also Wade, supra
note 77, at 1478.
85.
See, e.g. , Dallas, supra note 67; Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1363
(2002).
86.
Dallas, supra note 67, at 791-96.
See Dallas, supra note 85, at 1406-07. The emerging literature is
87.
considering the issues associated with a new set of roles and responsibilities for
directors in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley's effect on corporate governance,
and is redefining the duties by and roles of corporate directors in more complex
ways than the traditional "monitor or manage" models to include broader roles
in forging relationships with external constituencies and institutional investors.
See, e. g. , Dallas, supra note 67, at 801-09. Similarly, there is important analytic
work being done to determine whether corporations whose boards are dominated
by outside or independent directors are more profitable than more traditional
boards dominated by insiders and managers. See, e. g., Banjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Per
formance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 921-22 (1999). There is also thoughtful analysis
and research on how best to compose boards of directors to achieve the types of
leadership and decision-making that specific firms need from the governance
groups. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 76, at 810-11.
88.
Langevoort, supra note 76, at 810-11.
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recognition among scholars and businesspeople alike of the impor
tance of and need for a diverse leadership team in the corporate
boardroom.89 Reflecting that concern, Professor Lynne Dallas
states that "[w]omen, minorities, and non-nationals on corporate
boards may provide needed diversity in perspectives and may in
crease attention in the boardroom to the interests of employees,
,,
consumers, and the international marketplace. 9o
Congress, through passage of SOX, has made a statement
about the national importance of improved governance in Amer
ica's leading corporations, much as Enron (and other similar fail
ures in corporate governance) made a statement about how inade
quate governance will spawn significant economic and social prob
lems.91 The core of the emerging theories of corporate governance
is moving toward a model of diversity, independence, and repre
sentation in the composition and operation of corporate boards.92
Clearly, greater representation of women and minorities on gov
erning boards serves these national interests. The literature also
emphasizes the usefulness of deeper cross-disciplinary research
into corporate governance and effective management of the firm,
such as the application of managerial psychology to issues of the
composition of the board.93 As this literature grows, it may be pos
sible to more precisely articulate the precise contributions to more
objective, effective corporate governance from increased diversity
on corporate boards.
IV . CONCLUSION :

A CONFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICY

CONSIDERATIONS: TITLE VII, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND AN
ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO MORE DIVERSE REPRESENTATION

This article concludes with observations about the seemingly
unlikely confluence of policy considerations inherent in the history
and purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
89.
[d.
90.
Dallas, supra note 85, at 1363.
91 .
Dallas, supra note 67, at 791-96.
92.
[d.
93.
Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference, Behavioral
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
673, 762 (2005).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One point of congruence concerns
the policy of each legislative enactment: To improve, through
governmental action and public persuasion, significant aspects of
the American economy, including access to employment in fair,
non-discriminatory workplaces and enhanced efficiency and integ
rity in markets for securities and the conduct of corporations. In
deed, this article describes forty years of national pursuit of Title
VII goals of workplace diversity and non-discrimination. How
ever, it also identifies reasons to doubt that those goals have been
fully achieved through the creation of an atmosphere conducive to
more openly diverse workplaces. Finally, this article chronicles
the failures of corporate leadership-in the offices of CEOs and in
corporate boardrooms-that lead to the tragedies of Enron, MCI
and others, and the widespread conviction that a lack of independ
ence by corporate directors fostered a climate that permitted such
abuses and corruption. The fundamental polices of both legisla
tive enactments, it is argued, will be advanced by a pronounced,
renewed commitment to greater diversity in key leadership posi
tions in government, the judiciary and publicly traded corporations.
It is important to note that this article does not advocate for
mal affirmative action programs or policies for corporate director
ships or the amendment of Title VII to include appointments to
corporate boards or federal appellate judicial positions. Quota ap
pointment policies are being considered in other industrialized
countries, but, in the United States, there seems to be no demon
strated interest in such formal goals.94 However, it is appropriate
that government and business seek to find informal, voluntary
means of increasing the number of women and minorities who are
elected to serve on corporate boards.
The confluence in these areas of national public policy also is
represented by the growing body of literature and analysis that

TIME EUROPE, Sep. 14, 2003,
http://www.time.come/time/europe/genderlstory_3.html.
The Time Europe
story reports that Norway's government was threatening "to require companies
to make their boards 40% female if they did not do it voluntarily." [d. Appar
ently, the threat lead to an increase in the number of women directors and the
government gave the largest firms two years to achieve the 40% target goals or
face loss of their government charter. [d.

94.
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strongly suggests that many institutions are more efficiently man
aged by a diverse leadership group and that many workplaces are
better if they include a diverse workforce. This linkage between
diversity and better led organizations was a central theme in the
United States Supreme Court's recent affirmative action cases in
The Court's opinion in Grutter v.
volving higher education.95
Bollinger reveals the growing awareness that diversity is a funda
mental aspect of our educational processes, and that students will
be better prepared for the society and economy that they will lead
if their classrooms are more diverse.96 Indeed, the Court's analysis
demonstrates the significant congruence between the policies of
more effective workplaces and more diverse educational settings.97
The Court in Grutter acknowledged the roles that increased
diversity has played in making a more efficient military and the
importance of affirmative plans to increase representation of mi
norities.98 Moreover, the Court stated that the benefits of diversity
"are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have
made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
,,
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. 99 An amicus brief
by a Fortune 500 corporation pointed out that a truly diverse work
force "creates a competitive advantage by allowing a business to
leverage the diverse perspectives of its employees to improve deci
sion-making and increase productivity."IOO
The ideal of diversity as a fundamental goal of our society
has, according to Professor Peter Schuck, gained broad acceptance
in many aspects of public and private life.101 Affirmative action
policies and programs, whether in higher education or trade and
craft level employer, have had considerable effects of improving
diversity in workplaces, classrooms, the military, and elsewhere.
95.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz

v.

Bollinger, 539

U.S. 244 (2003).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330--31.
[d.
[d. at 331.
[d.
Id.

PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT
AT A SAFE DISTANCE 55 (2003).
101.
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So, there is reason for optimism that the fundamental policies un
derlying enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
have achieved many of its legislative goals and that it has created
"an atmosphere conducive to voluntary and local resolution"l02 of a
history of racial and gender discrimination. However, in some
areas, such as leadership of America's leading corporations, there
is considerable room for enhanced representation by women and
minorities, and it now appears clear that such enhanced representa
tion will help attain more effectively managed and responsibly led
corporations.

102.

United Steelworkers

v.

Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1979) (citation

omitted).
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